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TEACHING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
THROUGH SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 
Jill E. Fisch· 
Litigation abuse has received considerable public attention in the 
last several years. The shareholder suit is at the forefront of this 
debate . Corporate America, claiming that strike suits are crippling 
business profitability, has pressed for litigation reform. 1 Regulators 
at a variety of levels have responded to complaints of excessive 
litigation.2 At the same time, defenders of shareholder litigation 
stress its importance and warn that efforts to curtail litigation will 
reduce management accountability.3 
The debate, which is a lively one, offers a variety of teaching 
issues. Through the material on shareholder litigation, one can 
explore the basic themes of corporate law and corporate governance, 
including questions about the appropriate degree of separation of 
ownership and control in the public corporation, the relative merits 
of different governance mechanisms that seek to reduce agency costs 
and increase management accountability, and the appropriate role 
of litigation in business law. This Essay attempts to illustrate the 
relevance of shareholder litigation to some of the major themes I 
cover in the basic Corporations course. 
• Professor, Fordham Law School. 
1 See, e.g., Adam F. Ingber, IOb-5 Or Not lOb-5?: Are the Current Efforts to Reform 
Securities Litigation Misguided?, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 351, 363 (1993) (describing lobbying 
group, the Coalition to Eliminate Abusive Securities Suits (CEASS), formed by approxim ately 
300 corporate, accounting, and financial institutions, to press Congress to reform securities 
litigation); Barbara Franklin, Business Council Wages War on Derivative Suits, N.Y.L.J. , July 
8, 1993, at 5 (recounting lobbying effort by New York Business Council in support of bill to 
restrict derivative litigation in New York state). 
2 See, e.g., Central Bank v. First Interstate, 511 U.S. 164, 188-89 (1994) (observing 
particular risk of abusive litigation presented by shareholder suits against secondary 
defendants in connection with decision to reject aiding and abetting liability under section 
lO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); John W. Avery, Securities Litigation Reform: 
The Long and Winding Road to the Priuate Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 51 Bus. 
LAW. 335, (1996) (explaining concern over abusive litigation that led to adoption of the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act). 
3 See, e.g., Kenneth Jost, New York May Limit Stockholder Suits: Governor, Business 
Groups Back Bill to Giue Directors Veto Over Filings, 80 A.B.A. J. 24 (Mar. 1994) (quoting 
shareholder lawyer Ed Labaton). 
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Resisting the cynical view that the corporation always wins, my 
emphasis in this material is on the extent to which the rules 
established through shareholder litigation influence primary 
conduct. Thus, discussion focuses on the role of litigation in setting 
norms of corporate behavior and deterring corporate misconduct. 
The material also enables students to evaluate the role of the 
market and to consider whether regulation is necessary or appropri­
ate as a response to market problems. 
This analysis is most effective in the context of specific examples. 
Recently I have used two particular topics-executive compensation 
and corporate philanthropy-as a basis for students to evaluate the 
effectiveness of shareholder litigation and to compare litigation to 
other governance mechanisms. This process allows students to 
assess critically the traditional wisdom on the limited role afforded 
to shareholder litigation as a means of challenging business 
decisionmaking. 
Toward these ends, I structure my course to include a separate 
unit on shareholder litigation, which I schedule near the end of the 
semester. By this time, my students are familiar with the applica­
ble substantive law, including fiduciary duty, the business judgment 
rule, and the special rules applicable to takeover litigation. We have 
also extensively considered the problems associated with the 
separation of ownership and control and alternative governance 
mechanisms addressed to these problems, including the shareholder 
voting process, shareholder proposals, control contests, and 
mandatory disclosure. As a result, in addition to introducing 
students to the structure and mechanics of shareholder litigation, 
the unit serves to review and reinforce the previously covered 
background principles and to locate shareholder litigation within 
the relevant contract and agency principles of corporate law. 4 
4 The shareholder primacy principle can also be examined through the lens of 
shareholder litigation. Students can weigh the reasoning of cases that reserve to sharehold­
ers the right to bring derivative suits to redress a breach of fiduciary duty against the 
stakeholder theories of the corporation. See, e.g., D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy 
Norm, 23 IOWA J. CORP. L. 277 (1998) (describing history and influence of shareholder 
primacy). 
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I. THEORIES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND 
THE SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL 
747 
As Berle and Means observed, the separation of ownership and 
control in the modern public corporation has led to managerial 
control over corporate decisionmaking.5 Economics scholars defend 
specialized management as efficient,6  yet the agency costs associ· 
ated with the separation reduce this efficiency and create the risks 
of shirking and self· dealing. 7 Corporate law responds to these risks 
with a variety of governance mechanisms-mandatory disclosure, 
shareholder voting, the market for corporate control, and share· 
holder litigation. 
None of the mechanisms operates perfectly. Disclosure is costly 
and sacrifices the confidentiality of business operations in favor of 
greater transparency.8 Voting suffers from collective action 
problems such as shareholder apathy, as well as management 
control of the agenda. The market for corporate control is an overly 
blunt tool for ongoing management discipline and is subject to 
extensive market and legal constraints. 9 And shareholder litigation, 
because of its representative nature as well as collective action 
problems, offers the possibility of litigation abuse. 
5 See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEA.t'!S, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY 68 ( 1932) (describing how separation of ownership and control in public 
corporation has led to effective control by management).  
6 See, e.g., Lynn L. Dallas, Two lvfodels of Corporate Gouemance: Beyond Berle and 
Afeans, 2 2  U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 19,22-24 (1988) (describing efficiency model of firm, under 
which separation of ownership and control is viewed as efficient for society); E ugene F. Fama 
& Ivlichael C. Jensen, Separatio n  of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301 (1983) 
(arguing that separation of ownership and controi is efficient form of specialization). 
7 See, e.g., Alan R. Palmiter ,  Reshaping the Corporate Fiduciary Model: A Director's 
Duty of Independence, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1 35 1 ,  1 367 (1989) (identifyin g  "risk of managerial 
shirking and diversion" as "the price of operating through manager 'agents' "); Geoffrey S. 
Rehnert, Note, The Executive Compensation Contract: Creating Incentives to Reduce Agency 
Costs, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1 147, 1160 (1985) (describing agency costs resulting from separation 
of ownership and control). 
8 See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Empowering Inuestors: A lvfarket Approach to Securities 
Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2 359, 2373-8 1  (1998) (identifying and evaluatin g  costs and benefits 
of mandatory disclosure). 
9 See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Agents P/atching Agents: The Promise of Institutional 
Investor Foice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 8 1 1, 832 (1992) (identifying deficiencies in market for 
corporate control as mechanism for disciplining management). 
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In addition to the specific deficiencies of particular corporate 
governance tools, the general effort to increase management 
accountability poses a cost to business efficiency. 10 Economics 
teaches that management must enjoy a degree of discretion to 
operate effectively. For that discretion to exist, shareholders must 
be limited in their ability to second-guess management decisions. 
Extensive shareholder interference with managerial decisions, 
through voting, litigation, or otherwise, threatens to undermine the 
efficiency gains generated by the separation of ownership and 
control. Moreover, excessive accountability can make managers 
risk-averse and reduce corporate profitability. 
As a result of these concerns, corporate law moderates the degree 
to which shareholders can use governance mechanisms to oversee 
management decisionmaking. For example, shareholders have the 
right to vote proactively on very few subjects; the board of directors 
decides on the slate of director nominees, whether to propose a 
charter amendment, and whether to approve a merger. 11 State and 
federal law consider the majority of ordinary business decisions to 
be outside the scope of shareholder voting authority.12 Similarly, 
the effectiveness of the takeover market is largely subject to 
management control, as the board, through the use of poison pills, 
staggered boards, and other defensive tactics, can preclude share­
holders from selling their stock in a control contest. Finally, 
shareholder litigation is limited by the business judgment rule, 
which effectively shields most management decisions from judicial 
review. 13 
10 See, e.g., John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Corporate Cooperation, Relationship 
Management, and the Trialogical Imperative for Corporate Law, 78 MINN. L. REV. 1443, 1456 
n.51 (1994) (describing how interference with management autonomy by reducing discretion 
or increasing accountability may sacrifice efficiency provided by centralized m anagement). 
11 See, e.g., Alexander G. Simpson, Shareholder Voting and the Chicago School: Now is 
the Winter of our Discontent, 43 DUKE L.J. 189, 203-04 (1993) (explaining that shareholders 
are permitted to vote on "major structural issues"). 
12 See id. at 203-08 (describing state and federal law restrictions on shareholder control 
over most other corporate decisions). 
13 See generally DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE 5-19 (4th ed. 
1993) (describing business judgment rule). 
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II. SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION AND LITIGATION ABUSE 
A. THE STRUCTURE OF SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 
Shareholder litigation comes in two forms. The derivative suit 
enables shareholders to obtain redress for harms inflicted on the 
corporation, typically by corporate management. 14 Through the 
. 
derivative mechanism an individual shareholder can initiate suit, 
but the suit is brought on the corporation's behalf and the corpora­
tion, not the shareholder, receives any recovery. 15  The justification 
for allowing shareholders to initiate derivative suits is the concern 
that corporations are unlikely to sue officers and directors for harms 
to the corporation, because management controls litigation deci­
swns. 
Direct suits, in contrast, are attempts to redress harms inflicted 
on the shareholders directly. 16 In corporate law, one of the most 
important categories is litigation under the federal securities laws, 
addressing incomplete or inaccurate disclosure in connection with 
securities transactions . 17 Securities fraud litigation is typically 
initiated by purchasers or sellers of securities, who rely on misinfor­
mation conveyed by corporations or corporate management.18 
Both types of suits suffer from incentive problems. Although the 
aggregate damages at stake in shareholder litigation may be 
considerable, because most shareholders have a limited amount 
invested in any given corporation, their individual stakes in 
litigation are quite small. Accordingly, it is neither cost effective for 
most shareholders to investigate potential causes of action nor for 
them to initiate litigation. This problem, which is common to much 
small-stake or small-claimant litigation, is partially addressed by 
14 See, e.g., Jones v. H.F.  Ahmanson & Co. ,  460 P . 2d 464, 470 (Cal. 1969) (explaining 
nature of derivative suit). 
15 Jd. 
IG See id. (distinguishing direct suits from derivative suits). 
17 See, e.g., James D. Cox, The Social Meaning of Shareholder Suits, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 
3, 6 (1999) (describing significance of shareholder suits in corporate law). 
18 See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (limiting 
standing to defrauded purchasers and sellers). 
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allowing representative suits such as class actions. 1 9  Both securities 
fraud class actions and shareholder derivative suits allow a single 
shareholder to initiate a suit based on the aggregate harm. 
Nonetheless, because the plaintiffs recovery is limited to his or her 
damages (and because, in the case of a derivative suit, the plaintiff 
recovers only indirectly), representative litigation does not create a 
substantial incentive for plaintiffs to litigate. It does, however, 
create an incentive for plaintiffs counsel to litigate.20 
The evolution of both class actions and derivative litigation has 
departed further from the traditional litigation structure by creating 
an entrepreneurial role for plaintiffs' counsel.2 1 Under the current 
regime, counsel does not look to individual plaintiffs for payment of 
legal fees. Instead, counsel in a successful shareholder suit receives 
a court-awarded fee, which is typically paid out of the damages 
recovered. The size of the counsel fee may be based on the number 
of hours devoted to the case or the size of the recovery, but the 
court's evaluation generally considers the extent of the benefit 
provided by the litigation to the plaintiff class. As a result, plain­
tiffs' counsel may, and often does, recover substantially more from 
the suit than any individual shareholder. At the same time, counsel 
has an incentive to choose suits with large aggregate damage 
claims. 
The growth of the entrepreneurial lawyer creates a risk of 
litigation abuse. The risk stems from several factors.22 First, the 
lawyers who file suit may have a greater stake than any individual 
19 See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform: Lessons from Securities Litigation, 39 
ARiZ. L.  REV. 53.'3, 5 5 1  ( 1997) [hereinafter Fisch, Class Action Reform] (explaining how class 
action model permits cost-effective ligation in small claimant cases). 
20 See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 887 (2d Cir. 1982) (observing that "the real incentive 
to bring derivative actions is usually not the hope of return to the corporation but the hope 
of handsome fees to be recovered by plaintiffs' counsel"); Roberta Rom ano, The Shareholder 
Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 55, 63-65, 84 ( 1991 )  (describing 
empirical study of derivative suit settlements which finds that attorneys, not shareholders, 
are principal beneficiaries). 
21 See John C. Coffee, Jr. ,  The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing 
Fairness and Effidency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1 987) (describing 
entrepreneurial role of plaintiffs' counsel); Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform, Qui Tam, and 
the Role of the Plaintiff, 60 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 167, 17 1-76 ( 1 997) [hereinafter Fisch, Role 
of the Plaintiffl (describing evolution of class action away from traditional litigation model). 
22 See Fisch. Role of the Plaintiff, supra note 21 ,  at 173 (describing incentives created by 
ciass action structure). 
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shareholder, creating an incentive for the lawyers to make litigation 
decisions in their own, rather than their clients' interests. The 
problem is aggravated by the relatively small stakes of most 
shareholders, who are unlikely to monitor counsel's decisionmaking 
carefully. Additionally, the lawyer-client relationship is subject to 
its own set of agency costs. The lawyer seeks to maximize recovery 
subject to constraints of time and effort. The lawyer may also be 
risk averse, preferring a quick settlement that does not involve the 
investment of considerable litigation efforts over a lengthy and 
uncertain trial. Finally, the lawyer will prefer a recovery that 
maximizes his or her fee award, rather than one that maximizes the 
benefits to the plaintiffs. 
Critics of lawyer-driven litigation argue that lawyer control of 
litigation decisions leads to several problems. 23 First, they claim 
that lawyers generate excessive litigation, filing suits for their 
nuisance value, in an effort to generate quick settlements. Second, 
they warn that lawyers may make inappropriate settlement 
decisions without regard to merit in order to secure their fee 
awards. This may result in meritorious cases being settled too 
cheaply. Finally, lawyers may seek to file cases that, because they 
merely transfer money from one set of shareholders to another, 
produce little net value from the shareholders' perspective. 
In corporate litigation, a number of additional factors contribute 
to the problem. Corporate officers and directors are shielded from 
most exposure to liability for damages through mechanisms such as 
indemnification and insurance.24 These mechanisms insulate 
individual executives from most financial responsibility for corpo­
rate wrongdoing and may cause them to settle rather than incur the 
aggravation and exposure associated with extensive litigation. 
Additionally, the limitations on insurance policies and indemnifica­
tion provisions create a risk that executives who are found liable of 
serious wrongdoing may lose their coverage. Settlement agreements 
23 See Fisch, Class Action Reform, supra note 19, at 535 (recounting concerns about 
litigation abuse that led to adoption of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1 995) .  
z., See Reinier H .  Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of  Legal 
Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857, 86 1 -62 (1984) (describing degree to which officers and directors 
may be insulated from liability by indemnification and insurance). 
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can be drafted to insure that management's conduct meets the 
requirements for coverage. 
The extent to which the foregoing risks are realized-that is, the 
extent of litigation abuse that actually occurs-is unclear. Empiri­
cal studies have attempted to quantify litigation abuse by examining 
settlement statistics. In one of the most widely cited studies, for 
example, Janet Cooper Alexander evaluated the settlements in six 
securities class actions and concluded that all the suits settled for 
roughly the same percentage of the alleged damages, leading her to 
conclude that the suits were settled without regard to their merits. 25 
The problems inherent in measuring damages in shareholder suits 
create some difficulty in relying on these statistics, however. For 
example, Professors Elliott Weiss and John Beckerman conducted 
a study of the industry-wide price declines in the stocks that were 
the subject of Alexander's study and found that when industry 
effects were taken into account, Alexander's conclusions were 
seriously jeopardized. 26 
Moreover, any attempt to evaluate the utility of shareholder 
litigation cannot focus exclusively on after-the-fact damage awards, 
but must also consider the effect of litigation on management 
accountability. Defenders of shareholder litigation argue that the 
threat of litigation operates as a substantial deterrent to manage­
ment misconduct.27 If viable litigation reduces the incidence of 
wrongdoing, it provides benefits for which empirical studies do not 
account. 
25 See Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in 
Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 5 16-17  (1991)  (studying six suits in which 
settlements ranged from 20% to 27.35% of allowable recovery; two other cases were studied 
which settled for smaller amounts due to factors unrelated to their merits). 
26 See Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How 
Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 Y AlJE L.J. 
2053, 2083-84 (1995) (finding that, after adjusting for industry-wide effects on stock price, 
settlements in Alexander's study ranged from 23. 1 1% to 79.77% of recoverable damages). 
27 See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Capping Damages for Open-Market Securities Fraud, 
38 ARIZ. L. REV. 639, 643 (1996) (recommending that securities litigation be refocused to make 
deterrence the primary objective). 
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B. REGULATORY RESPONSES TO THE RISK OF LITIGATION ABUSE 
Business law has responded to the potential for abusive share­
holder litigation in two ways. First, the law limits the claims that 
may be raised in shareholder litigation. The business judgment rule 
is the most prominent of these limitations. By reducing the role of 
the courts in evaluating the merits of business decisions, the 
business judgment rule effectively insulates most management 
decisionmaking from judicial review.28 Moreover, because the 
business judgment rule imposes a threshold pleading burden on a 
plaintiff-shareholder, it allows courts to dismiss much litigation at 
an early stage. By reducing the cost to fight meritless litigation, the 
Tule reduces the potential for nuisance suits. 
Federal securities law contains similar substantive limitations. 
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 199529 creates a safe 
harbor for forward-looking statements, effectively allowing corpora­
tions that comply with the statutory requirements to insulate 
themselves from liability. 30 By adopting a proportionate liability 
scheme, the Reform Act also reduces the liability exposure of 
secondary defendants. The United States Supreme Court's decision 
in Central Bank v. First Interstate, 31 which rejected aiding and 
abetting liability, further limits the ability of plaintiffs to sue 
secondary wrongdoers. Together the statute and the Central Bank 
decision substantially curtail the ability of shareholders to sue deep 
pocket defendants who have limited involvement in the challenged 
transactions.32 The net result is to reduce the extent to which 
28 See, e.g., Henry T.C.  Hu, New Financial Products, the Modem Process of Financial 
Innovation, and the Puzzle of Shareholder Welfare, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1 273, 1316  (1991)  
(describing difficulty for shareholder in attacking management decisions because "[t]he 
business judgment rule virtually insulates all day-to-day decisions of management from 
attack"). 
29 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1 995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 
(coditl.ed at 15 U.S .C.  §§ 77a et seq. (1995)). 
30 See, e.g., Harris v.  IV AX Corp . ,  182 F .3d 799, 803 (11th Cir. 1999) (describing scope of 
safe harbor and concluding that it insulates defendants from liability for certain false and 
misleading statements and omissions). 
31 511 U.S.  164 ( 1994). 
: Jz See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch , The Scope of Private Securities Litigation: In Search of Liability 
Standards for Secondary Defendants, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1 293, 1303-05 ( 1999) (evaluating 
combined impact of Reform Act and Central Bank decision on liability exposure of secondary 
defendants). 
754 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:745 
frivolous litigation can increase the costs associated with employing 
the services of lawyers, accountants and investment bankers. 
The alternative to substantive limitations on liability exposure is 
procedural gatekeeping. State statutory and common-law rules 
impose a variety of procedural requirements on a shareholder who 
seeks to bring a derivative suit. 33 Plaintiffs must make a pre-suit 
demand that the corporation file suit or demonstrate that such a 
demand would be futile.34 Plaintiffs must meet the standing 
requirement of the contemporaneous ownership rule. 35 In many 
states, plaintiffs must post a bond as security for the corporation's 
expenses in the event that a court finds the suit was meritless.36 
Even when the plaintiff has complied with these requirements, the 
corporation may wrest control of the suit and have it dismissed over 
plaintiffs objection.37 
I devote particular attention in class to demand and dismissal of 
derivative litigation. The key issue in derivative litigation is 
whether the suit would benefit the corporation. The question posed 
by the demand and dismissal rules is who should make that 
determination. At one extreme, some courts have described 
litigation as a business decision no different from any other and 
accordingly held that the business judgment rule applies without 
qualification to a board's decision to refuse a demand or terminate 
litigation. 38 Other cases have recognized the structural problems 
associated with allowing directors to decide whether to sue their 
fellow directors and given the courts a more active role in exercising 
33 See, e.g., Theresa A. Gabaldon, Free Riders and the Greedy Gadfly: Examining Aspects 
of Shareholder Litigation as an Exercise in Integrating Ethical Regulation and Laws of 
General Applicability, 73 MINN. L. REV. 425, 435-37 (1988) (explaining common-law and 
statutory procedural  restrictions on derivative litigation). 
·''' See Aronson v. Lewis, 4 73 A.2d 805, 808 (Del. 1984) (describing demand requirement). 
35 See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §626 (b) (Mcfunney 1999) (requiring that plaintiff be a 
shareholder "at the time of bringing the action" and "at the time of the transaction of which 
he complains"). 
36 See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW§ 627 (JvlcKinney 1999) (imposing requirement that 
plaintiff post security for expenses). 
3; See, e.g., Zapata v. Maldonado, 430 A.Zd 779 (Del. 1981) (describing circumstances 
under which properly filed derivative suit may be dismissed by corporation). 
38 See, e.g., Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.Zd 994, 1002 (N.Y. 1979) (applying deferential 
business judgment rule scrutiny to decision of special litigation committee to terminate 
shareholder derivative suit). 
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their independent judgment as to whether dismissal is  proper.39 
Notably, however, courts give little deference to the shareholders' 
judgment, despite the theoretical objective of providing some 
shareholder control over litigation decisions. No state, for example, 
puts the issue of whether litigation should be pursued to a share­
holder vote. Nor do courts solicit the opinions of substantial 
shareholders as to whether the litigation should proceed. 
In light of these concerns, we discuss the universal demand 
requirement of the American Law Institute Principles of Corporate 
Governance.40 A universal demand requirement increases the 
degree of management control at the expense of shareholder 
authority. Because the New York legislature discussed adopting the 
universal demand requirement several years ago,4 1  we have the 
opportunity to consider the legislative role in revising corporate 
governance rules. My involvement in responding to the legislature's 
request for assistance in evaluating the proposal allows me to give 
the students detailed information on the process, including explain­
ing the identity and objectives of the bill's proponents, the concerns 
expressed by members of the legislature, and the role of lawyers, 
through the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, in 
addressing the proposal. 42 Ultimately, the New York legislature 
failed to adopt the proposal. Perhaps this failure was due in part to 
a carefully drafted evaluation by the Bar Association warning that 
39 See, e.g., Zapata, 430 A. 2d at 787 (rejecting application of pure business judgment 
analysis to dismissal decision). Further complications are created by the process of delegating 
the decision to an independent committee. We discuss the increasing reliance by courts on 
procedural safeguards, such as disinterested directors, independent counsel and extensive 
investigations and reports, the costs associated with this review, and the appropriate scope 
of judicial scrutiny. 
�0 See fu\-!ERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 7.03 (1992) (proposing u niversal demand requirement except in cases in 
which corporation would suffer irreparable injury); see also Carol B. Swanson, Juggling 
Shareholder Rights and Strike Suits in Derivative Litigation: The ALI Drops the Ball, 77 
MINN. L. REV. 1339, 1353-56 (1993) (describing universal demand requirement). 
41 See, e.g., Legislative Agenda: Bills Aim to Attract More Business to New York, N.Y.L.J., 
Feb. 16, 1995, at 5 (describing New York bill); Jost, supra note 3 (discussing same). 
' 12 I chaired a committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, which 
submitted comments to the legislature that included recommended changes in the proposed 
bill. See Legislative Agenda, supra note 41 (discussing support and opposition for proposal, 
including positions of Business Council and plaintiffs' bar). 
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legislative reform might disrupt the existing balance between 
addressing wrongdoing and protecting corporate decisionmaking. 43 
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act follows the state law 
approach of adopting procedural safeguards in an effort to curb 
litigation abuse.44 The heightened pleading standard of the Reform 
Act provides a threshold burden, like the business judgment rule, 
that allows early dismissal of purported nuisance litigation.45 By 
giving defendants the opportunity to have cases dismissed without 
incurring the time and cost of discovery, the Reform Act reduces the 
incentive for them to settle non-meritorious cases. The lead plaintiff 
provision is designed to create a procedural structure for reducing 
the agency problems associated with lawyer-driven litigation by 
vesting a lead plaintiff with greater control over litigation 
decisionmaking. 46 Finally, the Reform Act adopted a variety of 
restrictions intended to prevent the use of professional plaintiffs, 
including provisions that limit the number of lawsuits in which a 
person can serve as class representative,47 ban referral fees to 
brokers,48 and prohibit class representatives from receiving special 
compensation.49 
Again, because of my involvement in reviewing these reforms and 
the predecessor proposals in the Republican Contract with America, 
I am able to situate the existing statute within the framework of the 
alternative approaches that were considered and rejected.50 We 
'13 See id. (describing recommendations of City Bar committee). 
44 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 
(codified at 15 U. S.C. §§ 77a et seq. (1995)). 
45 See, e.g., Richard H. Walker & .J. Gordon Seymour, Recent Judicial and Legislative 
Developments Affecting the Private Securities Fraud Class Action, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1003, 1023-
27 (1998) (describing statutory language, legislative history and cases inte rpreting Reform 
Act's p leading standard). 
46 See Fisch, Class Action Reform, supra note 19, at 537-50 (discussing lead p laintiff 
provision). 
47 See 15 U. S. C. § 77z-1(a)(3)(B)(vi) (1997); 15 U. S. C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(vi) (limiting 
individuals to serving as lead p laintiffs in no more than five securities class actions during 
three-year period). 
48 15 U. S. C. § 780(c)(8). 
1� 15 U.S.C. § 77z-l(a)(4); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(4). 
5° For example, I p articipated in a panel  discussion at the City Bar Association that 
considered H.R. 10, the "Contract with America." H.R. 10: Common Sense Legal Reform or 
Unequal Access to Justice (Roundtable Discussion at the Association of the Bar of the City 
of New York, Feb. 7, 1995). I also drafted comments on various legislative proposals on behalf 
of the City Bar Association.  
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discuss procedural proposals such as loser pays 51 and guardians ad 
litem, 52 as well as substantive proposals such as imposing an actual 
knowledge standard and eliminating fraud on the market.53 In 
addition to evaluating the merits of these alternatives, my students 
are able to understand the evolution of a statute and appreciate the 
role of compromise and moderation. 
The procedural and substantive limitations on shareholder 
litigation can best be understood as creating a balance or trade-off 
between two competing objectives. On the one hand, these limita­
tions reduce both the potential for litigation abuse and the extent to 
which excessive litigation will unduly interfere with management 
decisionmaking. At the same time, the cost of these effects is 
diminished management accountability. By reducing the ability of 
plaintiff shareholders to litigate, these restrictions cause corpora­
tions and their shareholders to sacrifice some degree of compensa­
tion for damages caused by management malfeasance. In addition, 
by reducing the expected likelihood that management will be held 
accountable for wrongdoing, the restrictions reduce the deterrent 
effect of corporate law's liability rules. 
III. THE ROLE OF LITIGATION IN ADDRESSING 
CURRENT GOVERNANCE ISSUES 
The foregoing theoretical and legal analysis is more interesting 
and comprehensible when it is situated within the factual context 
of particular corporate decisions. In my course, I focus on two areas 
in which managerial decisionmaking may be suspect and explore the 
effectiveness of shareholder litigation in addressing the potential for 
management self-dealing. These examples also illustrate the 
relative advantages and disadvantages of shareholder litigation in 
relation to other governance mechanisms. 
51 See, e.g., D. Brian Hufford, Deterring Fraud us. Avoiding the "Strike Suit": Reaching 
An Appropriate Balance, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 593, 597-98 (1.995) (describing loser-pay provisions 
that were initially part of bills that became Reform Act). 
52 An earlier version of the Senate bill that became the Reform Act proposed guardians 
ad litem and plaintiffs' steering committees. S. 240, 104th Cong. §§ 101(c), 103 (1995). These 
provisions did not survive in the enacted legislation. 
53 See Common Sense Legal Reforms Act of 1995, H.R. 10, 104th Cong. § 204 (1995) 
(requiring proof of actual reliance in 10b-5 actions). 
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A. EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 
Commentators have criticized the growth of executive compensa­
tion in the 1980s and 1990s.54 Executive compensation is frequently 
described as excessive in comparison to average worker salaries, 55 
the salaries paid to foreign executives, 56 and the value added by top 
executives. 57 Executive compensation has been at the forefront of 
corporate governance concerns for the last several years. The same 
media that bemoans shareholder litigation as abusive and excessive 
decries the large salaries paid to American executives as excessive 
and wasteful. 58 Executive compensation also presents the 
prototypical opportunity for management self-dealing. Although 
state corporation law typically vests the board of directors with the 
authority to set the salaries of top corporate executives, there are a 
variety of reasons to question the ability of a board to exercise 
independent judgment over compensation decisions. Indeed many 
experts have concluded that executive compensation is not dictated 
54 See, e.g., James E. Heard, Shareholders Focus Concerns on Executiue Compensation 
at 1992 Annual Meetings, 6 INSIGHTS 20 (1992) (describing average CEO compensation as 
increasing by more than 200% during the 1 980s). 
55 See John A. Byrne et al., That Eye-Popping Executiue Pay, Bus. WK., Apr. 25, 1 994, at 
55  (describing "gulf between the executive suite and the shop floor" as "as wide as a canyon"); 
Tim Smart, Pay Gap Widens Between Worker, Boss, WASH. POST, Aug.  30, 1999,  at A6 
(reporting that "the sixth annual survey of executive compensation by the Institute for Policy 
Studies and United for a Fair Economy, finds the ratio of top executive to factory worker pay 
has exploded this decade to 4 1 9  to 1 last year from 42 to 1 in 1980"). 
56 See Don L. Boroughs et al. ,  Winter of Discontent, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,  Jan. 22, 
1996, at 47, 54 (comparing ratio between compensation of CEO and that of average worker 
in  United States to that in Germany); Uma V. Sridharan, CEO Influence and Executiue 
Compensation, 3 1  FIN. REV. 5 1  ( 1 996) (describing high level of U.S.  CEO compensation 
relative to that in Japan). 
57 See Robert J. McCartney, Executiue Pay Rises, as Profits Fall, WASH. POST, Apr. 25, 
1992, at Cl (stating that average CEO compensation at U.S. corporations rose during 199 1 
even though profits fell  sharply); Irwin M. Stelzer, Are CEOs Overpaid?, THE PUBLIC 
INTEREST, Winter 1997, at 26, 32 (reviewing several empirical studies which conclude that 
link between CEO pay and corporate performance is "somewhere between weak and non­
existent"). 
58 See, e.g., John A. Byrne, The Flap Over Executive Pay, Bus. WK., May 6, 1 991, at 90 
(describing attention and controversy over executive pay levels). 
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by market forces and that corporate CEOs exert undue influence 
over their compensation packages. 59 
Shareholder litigation is rarely successful in challenging 
compensation decisions. Courts traditionally treat executive 
compensation as a routine business decision that is virtually 
immune from judicial review under the business judgment rule.60 
Indeed, executive compensation seems to be a prototypical subject 
for application of the business judgment rule. As the court in the 
classic Heller v. Boylan61 decision explained, courts are ill-equipped 
to review compensation decisions.62 Moreover, although the doctrine 
of waste remains available as a basis for challenging particularly 
egregious cases of overcompensation, as evidenced in Rogers v. 
Hill,63 the case is perhaps most noteworthy for its aberrational 
nature.64 
The recent case of In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation65 
provides a typical illustration of the utility of shareholder litigation 
as a tool for challenging compensation decisions. Shareholders 
brought suit based on the Disney board's decision to award a 
severance package of $140 million to Michael Ovitz after concluding 
that his employment as president of Disney for fourteen months was 
not working out. 66 The court in Disney was unswayed by allegations 
that the severance package was "larger than almost anyone 
anywhere will receive in the lifetime of any of the parties, and 
perhaps larger than any ever paid."67 Despite its size, the court 
59 One of the best-known compensation consultants, now a critic of excessive pay, wrote 
a book several years ago describing a process by which a CEO could get his or her board of 
directors to approve virtually any compensation package unconstrained by legal or market 
forces. GRAEF S. CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF EXCESS (1991). 
60 29 N.Y. S.2d 653 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1941). 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 679-80. 
63 289 U.S. 582 (1933). 
61 See, e.g. , Steiner v. Meyerson, No. CIV.A.13139, 1995 WL 441999, at *5 (Del. Ch. July 
19, 1995) (observing that non-fraudulent (and non-negligent) claims against disinterested 
parties that meet legal standard of waste may be "rarest of all" and "possibly non-existent"); 
id. at *8 (holding that grant of immediately exercisable stock options does not constitute 
corporate waste "[s]o long as there is some rational basis for directors to conclude that the 
amount and form of compensation is appropriate"). 
65 731 A.2d 342 (Del. 1998). 
66 Id. at 350, 352. 
67 Id. at 350. 
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explained that conventional corporate governance laws applied, and 
concluded that the suit was barred by the demand requirement and 
the business judgment rule.68 
The case demonstrates that the procedural barriers to derivative 
litigation effectively preclude challenges to executive compensation. 
The Disney court was unpersuaded by plaintiffs' allegations that the 
decisionmaking process leading to the package was defective. 
Plaintiffs demonstrated that Ovitz was a close personal friend of 
Disney CEO Michael Eisner69 and presented a variety of conflicts 
and personal ties between members of the Disney board and Eisner, 
suggesting that the board of directors could not fairly evaluate the 
compensation.70 Nonetheless, the court concluded that the Disney 
board was sufficiently capable of exercising independent business 
judgment.7 1  This decision foreclosed further judicial inquiry. 
Accordingly, the court dismissed the complaint for failure to comply 
with the demand requirement. 
Rogers v. HilC2 and Disney pose threshold questions about how 
to evaluate executive compensation. Are the media claims of 
overpayment justified? Can we compare the salaries of top execu­
tives with those of football players and movie stars?73 These 
68 Id. at 350-5 1 ,  36 1 ,  365. 
6 9  ld. at 355. 
70 Id. at 356-6 1 .  
7 1  ld. at 36 1 .  The court found the board sufficiently independent notwithstanding 
widespread public criticism of the Disney board's lack of independence. See, e.g., Joh n  A. 
Byrne, The Best and Worst Boards, Bus. WK. , Dec. 8, 1997,  at  90 (naming D isney's directors 
worst board in America in its second annual a nalysis of corporate governance); Bruce Orwall 
& Joann S. Lublin, The Plutocracy: If a Company Prospers, Should its Directors Behave by 
the Book?, WALL ST. J. , Feb. 24, 1997,  at  A 1  (detailing personal ties between several board 
members and Eisner); Paul Tharp, Eisner 's Problems Put Him Deeper into Mouse Hole, N.Y. 
POST, May 20, 1999, at 36 (stating that "[j)ust three of Disney's 16 directors are fully 
independent, and the rest are either friends or financial associates"). 
72 289 U.S.  582 (1933). 
73 At a recent conference, Professor Melvin Eisenberg drew a comparison between 
compensation of top executives and that of professional athletes, suggesting that the a thletes 
were compensated more appropriately based on past performance. Panel Discussion, 
Compensation: Balancing Accountability and Incentives, The Federalist Society, Fourth 
Annual Conference on Corporate Governance Issues (Sept. 16, 1 999) [hereinafter Federalist 
Society Conference] . But see Sam Walker & Jonathan B. Weinbach, All-Stars of '99, WALL 
ST. J. ,  Sept. 3, 1999, at Wl (describing lack of correlation between pay and performance 
among top football players); Top Executive Pay Peeves The Public, Bus. WK. , June 25,  1 984, 
at 15 (describing poll finding that " [o] n the scale of public tolerance for the amount of money 
they make, executives rank a little above star professional athletes"). 
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questions lead to a discussion of pay-for-performance. Recent trends 
toward incentive-based compensation have generated a variety of 
innovative compensation tools and have increased the percentage of 
executive compensation that is, at least nominally, performance­
based. 74 At the same time, these trends have apparently accelerated 
the inflation of compensation packages.75 An alternative approach 
to executive compensation focuses on the decisionmaking process. 76 
Are decisions improved by the use of compensation consultants and 
independent compensation committees?77 Graef Crystal's role in 
designing Ovitz's compensation is illustrative of the role of consul­
tants. 78 
The Disney court's decision may be justified on the basis that 
shareholder litigation is a poor tool for challenging executive 
compensation. That conclusion must be based, however, on an 
assessment of the available alternatives for monitoring compensa­
tion decisions. Several such alternatives exist. One alternative is 
a regulatory solution-legal limits on the amount or type of 
executive compensation that corporations can pay. The adoption of 
Internal Revenue Code section 162(m) represents a limited regula­
tory approach. Section 162(m) limits the deductibility of non­
performance-based compensation payments exceeding $ 1  million per 
74 See Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation 9-25 (working paper dated Apr. 1 998) 
(copy on file with author) (describing components of CEO compensation). 
75 See id. at 21 (describing "explosion in stock option grants" which "now constitute the 
single largest component of CEO pay"). 
76 Recently a respected practitioner suggested to me that the problem of excessive 
executive compensation could be addressed through careful  guidelines on the composition and 
responsibilities of compensation committees akin to the proposals for audit committees 
contained in the NASD Blue Ribbon Committee's Report and Recommendations on Improving 
the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees (1999). 
77 See, e.g., Chris O'Malley, Executive Pay Committees: It 's a Question of Objectivity, 
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, May 23, 1999, at A0 1 (identifying variety of conflicts that could 
compromise independence of compensation committee decisions). 
78 Crystal, who advised the Disney board on Ovitz's employment agreement, was later 
quoted as saying that "nobody quantified [the total cost of the severance package] and I wish 
we had." In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. , 731  A.2d 342, 361  (Del. 1 998). In his book 
Crystal describes the compensation consultant's role primarily as furnishing ammunition for 
the CEO to justify his or her desired increase in compensation to the board of directors. 
CRYSTAL, supra note 59, at 42-50. 
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year.79 The provision provides a good example of the shortcomings 
of regulatory approaches to corporate governance. In  addition to 
being subject to criticism for arbitrarily specifying a fixed dollar 
amount limit without reference to corporate size, section 162(m) has 
had the perverse effect of causing many companies to increase 
executive salaries to the $ 1  million cap80 or, alternatively, causing 
companies to pay their executive with stock option grants worth 
many times the limit because option grants are deemed 
performance-based compensation and, hence, are exempted from the 
cap .sl  
An alternative governance approach is disclosure. Sensitive to 
concerns about excessive executive compensation, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) amended its rules to mandate 
disclosure of executive compensation in corporate proxy 
statements.82 As several commentators have observed, however, 
this disclosure may have the perverse effect of increasing compensa­
tion levels as corporate executives become increasingly aware of 
payments made to their peers.83 Disclosure may actually provide 
executives ammunition with which to negotiate pay increases from 
their corporations. 
Executive compensation has also been the target of increased 
shareholder activism. Institutional investors have mounted 
challenges to executive compensation through the shareholder 
79 See James R. Repetti, Accounting and Taxation: The Misuse of Tax Incentives to Align 
Management-Shareholder Interests, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 697, 708-09 (1997) (describing 
operation of Regulation 162(m)). 
80 See John A. Byrne, That 's Some Pay Cap, Bill, Bus. WK. , Apr .  25, 1994, at 57 
(explaining that cap has effectively established standard for executive pay). 
81 Repetti, supra note 79, at 709. 
82 See Executive Compensation Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 3 3-6962,  52 SEC 
Doc. 1961 (Oct. 16, 1992) (imposing extensive disclosure requirements for executive 
compensation); Jill E. Fisch, From Legitimacy to Logic: Reconstructing Proxy Regulation, 46 
V A.t'ID. L. REV. 1129, 1161 (1993) (hereinafter Fisch, Proxy Regulation] (describing rationale 
behind SEC's decision to require disclosure of executive compensation). 
83 See Donald C. Langevoort, Commentary, Stakeholder Values, Disclosure, and 
Materiality, 48 CATH. U .L. REV. 93, 97 (1998) (observing that disclosure of compensation may 
have caused corporations to raise pay faster "as peer payments become more visible"); see also 
Federalist Society Conference, supra note 73 (noting that disclosure of executive compensa­
tion may be counterproductive in that transparency may be counterproductive-ifCEOs know 
what their peers are being paid, each has negotiating ammunition to pressure his or her 
corporation to pay comparably). 
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proposal process, 84 by voting against compensation plans, 85 and by 
withholding votes from the board of directors to protest excessive 
compensation packages. 86 The SEC has facilitated the use of 
shareholder voting to address executive compensation by reversing 
its position under Rule 14a-8 and requiring corporations to include 
shareholder proposals dealing with executive compensation on the 
corporate proxy.87 
Disney provides students with a good case study for examining 
the operation of these governance alternatives. Students can review 
the SEC-mandated disclosure in Disney's proxy statement and learn 
how much CEO l\1ichael Eisner gets paid, as well as evaluate the 
effectiveness of Disney's performance-based compensation 
structure.88 Students can also evaluate the quality of this disclosure 
by reviewing articles in the popular press. 89 Recent articles also 
detail the response by institutional investors both to Eisner's 
compensation package and to Disney's governance structure. We 
discuss a number of the initiatives that investors have directed at 
Disney, such as a recent proposal that Disney's future stock option 
8'1 See, e.g., Corporate Governance: Firms Flex Their Muscles, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, 
Oct. 19 ,  1 998, at 109 (stating that institutional investors filed 7 1  shareholder proposals 
addressing executive compensation during 1998 proxy season); Citigroup, 1999 SEC No­
Action Letter, LEXlS 1 33,  at •· 1 0  (Feb. 4,  1999) (describing proposal which sought, inter alia, 
to establish "a cap on total CEO compensation as a multiple of pay of the lowest paid worker 
at Citigroup"). 
85 See, e.g. , Richard C. Ferlauto, Labor's Growing Shareholder Activism Agenda, 
PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, i\'Iar. 23, 1998, at 12 (citing 1996 Corporate Governance Review 
data showing increase in shareholder voting cast against executive compensation plans). 
86 See, e.g., James E. Heard & Patrick S. McGurn, Corporate Governance Audit for 1 998, 
INSIGHTS, Dec. 1997,  at 3 (describing "just vote no" efforts by activist investors in 1 997 proxy 
season). 
87 Previously the SEC has determined that shareholder proposals addressing executive 
compensation could be excluded under Rule 14a-8(c)(5) as matters relating to the ordinary 
business operations of the issuer. See Fisch, Proxy Regulation, sztpra note 82, at 1 1 60-6 1 
(describing SEC's original position and its reversal of that position in 1991) .  
8 8  Disney's 1999 Proxy Statement, dated February 23, 1999, is available on LEXIS­
NEXIS in the EDGARPlus file .  Michael Eisner's employment agreement is described on page 
thirteen and his compensation is quantified in a table on page fourteen .  
89 See, e.g., Derrick Z. Jackson, Falling into the Gap, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 3 ,  1 999, at  
Al9 (describing Eisner as highest paid U.S.  executive in 1998 with compensation totaling 
$575.6 million). 
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grants be performance-based90 and TIAA-CREF's proposals calling 
for a more independent board of directors.9 1  We also observe that 
CalPERS cast "no" votes for Disney's board nominees in an effort to 
protest the board's lack of independence.92 
Finally, I ask the student to consider possible corporate responses 
and the degree to which these initiatives may change governance 
policies. We observe that Disney recently bowed to institutional 
pressure and agreed to add two additional independent directors to 
its board.93 At the same time, we note the continued corporate 
efforts to preclude institutional activism. For example, Disney 
resisted the CWA shareholder proposal on performance-based stock 
options, arguing that it is excludable because it deals with the 
ordinary business operations of the company.94 Disney also 
responded to the anticipated controversy at its annual meeting by 
changing the location of that meeting from Anaheim to Kansas 
City.95 
B. CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY 
A second topic that tests the operation of the tools of corporate 
governance is corporate philanthropy. Early in the course, in 
connection with fiduciary duties, I teach a unit covering corporate 
objectives. In this unit, we discuss the stakeholder model of the 
corporation and contrast it with the principle of shareholder 
primacy. I then ask the students whether corporate philanthropy 
can be justified. 
90 See Phyllis Feinberg, Disney Stars in First Proxy War: Union Wants 1999 Proposal on 
Performance-Based Options, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Nov. 2, 1 998, at  3 (detailing 
shareholder proposal submitted by Communication Workers of America requesting that all 
future stock option grants be performance-based). 
9 1  See Dave McNary, Stockholder Ends Bid to Open Disney Board, DAILY NEWS OF L.A. , 
Dec. 5, 1 998, at B2 (discussing TIAA-CREF's decision to withdraw its 1999 proposal after 
D isney agreed to add two independent directors following 35% shareholder vote in support 
of CREF's 1 998 proposal). 
92 Heard & McGurn, supra note 86, at 3. 
9 3  See McNary, supra note 91 (illustrating how Disney caved to TIAA-CREF pressure). 
9 1  See Feinberg, supra note 90 (describing Disney's efforts to persuade SEC that CWA 
proposal can be excluded from proxy statement). 
fl5 See Claudia Eller,  Disney Cottld Encounter Stormy Scene at Midwest Meeting Site, L.A. 
TIMES, Feb. 24, 1998, at D l  (questioning whether change of annual meeting site was 
motivated by effort to avoid controversy) . 
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Under either model, the rationale for corporate philanthropy is 
unclear. Although corporations defend much of their charitable 
giving in business terms, and this defense is reasonable, donations 
that enhance long-term corporate value do not require different 
legal treatment from other corporate expenditures. Nonetheless, 
both corporate law and tax law afford special treatment to corporate 
expenditures that are characterized as philanthropic. Specifically, 
under the laws of most states, management need not defend 
charitable giving as serving the interests of the corporation, no 
matter how those interests are defined.96 Indeed, some statutes, 
such as the New York Business Corporation Law, explicitly 
authorize management to make charitable donations "irrespective 
of corporate benefit."97 This language suggests that it is legal and, 
at least in some cases, appropriate for corporations to make 
donations that cannot be justified in business terms.98 The applica­
tion of this principle presents a challenge for corporate governance. 
The broad language of statutory authorizations of corporate 
philanthropy make such philanthropy nearly impossible to challenge 
through shareholder litigation. If corporate philanthropy need not 
serve a business purpose, what standard should the courts apply in 
reviewing a donation? One obvious possibility is the business 
judgment rule, yet there are problems in applying the business 
judgment rule to a non-business decision.99 The potential for 
management self-dealing in connection with corporate philanthropy 
also raises a question about the suitability of applying the business 
judgment rule's deferential standard of review. 100 An alternative 
% See Faith Stevelman Kahn, Pandora 's Box: Managerial Discretion and the Problem 
of C01porate Philanthropy, 44 UCLA L. REV. 579, 602-03 ( 1 997) (describing current state 
corporate law regulation of corporate philanthropy). 
97 N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW §202(12) (McKinney 1999). 
98 See Jill E.  Fisch, Corporate Philanthropy is as American as Apple Pie, 84 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1282, 1 326 ( 1999) [hereinafter Fisch, Corporate Philanthropy] (distinguishing category 
of corporate philanthropy that cannot be j ustified in terms of benefit to corporation). 
n9 See Faith Stevelman Kahn, Legislatures, Courts and the SEC: Reflections on Silence 
and Power in Corporate and Securit1:es Law, 4 1  N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1 107,  1 123 ( 1997) 
(arguing that " [t]he [existing] standards of fiduciary care and loyalty and the business 
judgment rule cannot appropriately be applied, at least as they have traditionally been 
defined in the corporate case law, to the review of management's decisions regarding 
charitable contributions"). 
1 00 Jill E.  Fisch, Questioning Philanthropy from a Corporate Governance Perspective, 4 1  
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1 0 9 1 ,  1 096 ( 1997) [hereinafter Fisch, Questioning Philanthropy]. 
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approach would permit courts to review donations in terms of their 
size by applying some variation of a reasonableness standard.
10 1 As 
the preceding material on executive compensation demonstrated, 
however, the absence of judicially manageable standards for 
determining when an expenditure is reasonable, particularly when 
viewed against the scale of a large public corporation's earnings or 
other expenditures, makes such an evaluation impractical.102 Even 
a very large contribution represents an almost immaterial fraction 
of the earnings of an IBM or Exxon. 
Again, the problem is best illustrated by example . The decision 
in Kahn v. Sullivan 103 demonstrates the impotence of shareholder 
litigation as a tool for maintaining accountability in corporate 
charitable giving. After Armand Hammer, then CEO of Occidental 
Petroleum, became dissatisfied with the responsiveness of the Los 
Angeles Museum of Art to his overtures, 104 he proposed that 
Occidental build a museum to house his art collection. The proposal 
for the Armand Hammer Museum and Cultural Center of Art, which 
would cost $86 million/05 was approved by Occidental's board of 
d.irectors. 106 The project was subsequently challenged through 
shareholder litigation. The Occidental board appointed a special 
litigation com mittee,  and the litigation was rapidly resolved
107 
through a cheap settlement, allowing the project to proceed with 
10 1  See Kahn, supra n ote 96 ,  at 606-08 (describing De laware courts' use of reasonableness 
approach). 
102 See id. at 606-07 (criticizing Delaware courts' reliance on charitable contribu�ion 
provisions of Internal Revenue Code as measure of reasonableness for corporate contnbu­tions). 
103 594 A.2d 48 (Del. 1 9 9 1) .  
10� Apparentl_Y the m useu m  refused  Hammer's request that galleries be named after hi:U. 
See Melvm A Eisenberg, Corpo rate Conduct That Does Not Maximize Shareholder Gam: 
Legal Conduct, Ethica l  Conduct, The Penumbra Effect, Reciprocity, the Prisoner
's Dilemma, 
Sheep 's Clothing, Social Conduct, and Disclosure, 28 STET. L. REV. 1, 23 (1998) (describing 
history of Hammer m useum project). 
105 Id. 
106 See Kahn, 594 A 2 d  at 52-55 (describing board's consideration of museum p roposal).  
107 The settlement n egotiation p rocess was, itself, somewhat questionable .  See Kahn v. 
Occidental Petroleum Corp. ,  Civ. A. No.  10808, 1 989 Del.  Ch. LEXIS 92, at * 1 ,  * 1 3 (Del .  Ch. 
July 19, 1989) (denyin g  "extraordinary motion to preliminarily enjoin a settlement in the proce�; of being _negotiated," but observing that negotiation process raised "troublesome Issues that coula be heard a t  settlement hearing). 
l 
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some minor modifications in terms.1 08 Although other shareholders, 
including CalPERS, objected to the settlement terms, 109 the 
Delaware Court of Chancery ultimately approved the settlement, 
and the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed.1 10 
In reviewing the settlement, the Delaware courts were faced with 
the task of determining whether the settlement terms were fair and 
reasonable. In doing so, courts weigh the likelihood that the suit 
will be successful against the benefits provided to the corporation 
and its shareholders by the settlement.1 1 1 In Kahn, the benefits 
conferred by the settlement were, by all accounts, minimal; the 
Court of Chancery described the settlement as "meager ." 1 12 
Nonetheless, the courts concluded that the suit had little likelihood 
of success on the merits because it was "highly probable" that the 
business judgment rule would protect the directors' decision.1 13 
The courts reached this conclusion despite the absence of any 
proffered business purpose for the donation and despite no evidence 
that the donation was reasonable in size. 1 14 The absence of a legal 
requirement that corporate philanthropy be justified by a business 
purpose makes it virtually impossible for a court to review philan-
108 The terms of the settlement, which are described in the opinion of the Delaware Court 
of Chancery, included changing the name of the museum to the "Occidental Petroleum 
Cultural Center Building," and limiting Occidental's expenditures for the museum to $50 
million p lus an additional $10 million for cost overruns. See Sullivan v. Hammer, No. Civ. 
A. 10823, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 1 19 ,  at * 1 0- 1 1  (Del. Ch. Aug. 7, 1990) (describing terms of 
settlement). The additional $10 million expenditure was approved by Occidental's special 
committee even before the appeal of the Court of Chancery decision approving the settlement 
reached the Delaware Supreme Court. See Kahn, 594 A.2d at 58 (describin g  special 
committee meeting to approve expenditure). 
109 Kahn, 594 A.2d at 50-51 .  
1 10 Id. at 63 .  
1 1 1  See, e.g., Lewis v.  Hirsch, No. Civ. A. 12 ,53 1 ,  1 994 Del .  Ch. LEXIS 68 ,  at *6·7 (Del .  Ch. 
June 1 ,  1994) (describing legal standard for judicial review of  proposed settlement). 
1 1 2  Sullivan, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 1 19, at * 3. 
1 1 3  Kahn, 594 A.2d at 51 .  As the Court of Chancery explained, " [t]he potential for ultimate 
success on the merits here is, realistically, very poor. The business judgment rule, as 
consistently reiterated by the Delaware Supreme Court, stands as an almost impenetrable 
barrier to the plaintiffs." Sulliuan, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 1 19, at * 15 .  
1 1 4 The Court of Chancery, relying on Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 25 7 A.2d 398 
(Del. Ch. 1 969), held that the test for whether a charitable contribution was proper was its 
reasonableness. Sulliuan, 1990 Del .  Ch. LEXIS 1 19 ,  at * 19. The court then stated 
conclusorily, " [f]rom the present record it is also clear that the present gift (as now limited) 
is within the range of reasonableness." I d.; see also Kahn, 594 A.2d at 61 (detailing objectors' 
arguments that size of Occidental's contribution was unreasonable). 
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thropic decisions under existing legal standards. As a result, the 
Kahn court had little choice but to approve the settlement regard­
less of its terms. 
The opinions in Kahn actively discourage shareholders from 
using litigation to challenge corporate philanthropy. Although Kahn 
presents one of the more egregious cases of self-dealing masquerad­
ing as philanthropy, the courts refused to look behind the Occidental 
board's superficial justification of the expenditures in affording the 
transactions the presumptive protection of the business judgment 
rule. Thus, to the extent that corporate donations pose the risk of 
management self-dealing, 1 15  shareholders must consider governance 
alternatives. 
Existing alternatives offer little potential for maintaining 
management accountability with respect to corporate philanthropy. 
Current law does not require corporations to disclose their charita­
ble donations. Shareholder voting is not a viable alternative 
because state law does not require shareholder approval of charita­
ble expenditures, and it is unclear whether shareholder efforts to 
vote on charitable giving would be permissible. 1 16 Moreover, 
although shareholders have attempted to place the propriety of 
corporate giving policies before the shareholders through use of 
precatory shareholder proposals, the SEC generally has permitted 
corporations to exclude such proposals on the ground that they 
relate to the company's ordinary business operations. 1 1 7  
1 15 See generally Jayne W. Barnard, Corporate Philanthropy, Executives' Pet Charities and 
the Agency Problem, 41 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 1 147 (1997) (describing risk of self-dealing 
presented by corporate philanthropy). 
1 16 Cf Lawrence A Hamermesh, Corporate Democracy and Stockholder-Adopted By-Laws: 
Taking Back the Street?, 73 TUL. L. REV. 409, 4 14, 467-68 (1998) (arguing that shareholder­
proposed bylaws attempting to limit directors' power to adopt "poison pills" impermissibly 
interfere with directors' authority under Delaware statute to manage corporation). 
1 1 7  See, e.g., Pacific Telesis Group, 1 992 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2 18 (Feb. 20, 1992) (finding 
proposal that registrant make contributions to Planned Parenthood excludable under Rule 
14a-8(c)(7) as "the determination to commence contributions to a particular charity"); SCE 
Corp. ,  1 992 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 214 (Feb. 20, 1992) (holding proposal that registrant consider 
donating prescribed amount of money to qualified charities which work to improve fisheries 
and wildlife habitat excludable under Rule 14a-8(c)(7) as "the determination to commence 
contributions to a particular charity''); Kmart Corp. ,  1998 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 350 (Mar. 4, 
1998) (finding proposal that registrant refrain from donating to organizations that perform 
abortion excludable under Rule 14a8(c)(7) as dealing with "contributions to specific types of 
organizations"). 
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To date, corporate philanthropy has not spurred the public and 
regulatory attention that has been focused on executive compensa­
tion. 1 18 Nonetheless, commentators have warned that philanthropy 
poses analogous risks of management self-dealing. 1 19 Several 
preliminary proposals seek to increase accountability through 
analogous governance mechanisms, such as Congressman Paul 
Gillmor's bill requiring public companies to disclose their charitable 
donations to investors. 120 
As with executive compensation, these proposals demonstrate the 
weaknesses of existing governance tools. For example, mandated 
disclosure of philanthropy raises application issues similar to those 
that plague disclosure of compensation: the definitional scope of 
philanthropy, the problem of quantifying contributions of property 
and employee time, and the extent to which cause-related marketing 
programs should be classified as philanthropy. More broadly, any 
increase in required corporate disclosures triggers concerns that 
corporations will sacrifice business confidences and that disclosure 
will unduly increase interference with day-to-day business opera­
tions. 
1 18 The relative absence of efforts to regulate corporate philanthropy is independently 
worthy of comment. Charitable giving m ay provide a mechanism by which corporations can 
purchase political favor while avoiding the legal restrictions on corporate political activity. 
Fisch, Questioning Philanthropy, supra note 1 00, at 1 10 1-02. Accordingly, a public choice 
analysis may explain legislative reluctance to subject philanthropic decisions to increased 
public scrutiny. 
1 1 9  See Barnard, supra note 1 15,  at 1 148 (warning that much corporate giving is driven 
by personal desires of executives rather than strategic considerations); Kahn, supra note 96, 
at 624-25 (proposing mandatory disclosure of corporate contributions in order to deter 
management self-dealing). The potential for manage ment self-dealing strengthens the 
analytical connection between executive compensation and corporate philanthropy as 
governance �sues. 
120 Representative Gillmor has introduced two bills proposing alternative ways of 
regulating corporate philanthropy. The first follows the disclosure policy employed by the 
SEC with respect to executive compensation. It would require p ublic companies to report the 
amounts and recipients of charitable contributions in connection with their periodic disclosure 
to investors. H.R. 944, 1 05th Cong. (1997). The second bill, modeled on Berkshire 
Hathaway's Berkshire Plan, would require public companies to permit shareholders to 
determine the recipients of corporate charitable giving. See Fisch, Corporate Philanthropy, 
supra note 98, at 1 323 (describing two bills); see also Barnard, supra note 1 1 5 , at 1 1 70 
(proposing modification of tax code to limit deductibility of corporate charitable contributions 
that fail to meet specified criteria). 
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IV. SOME PEDAGOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The foregoing material allows the students to evaluate the 
effectiveness of shareholder litigation at addressing two problematic 
areas in corporate governance. Mter an analysis of the substantive 
issues and the potential for management self-dealing, the students 
are able to recognize the substantial limitations on shareholder 
litigation as a governance tool. Indeed, courts have essentially 
insulated these particular subjects from judicial review by relegat­
ing challenges to the little-used doctrine of waste and ignoring the 
potential for management self-dealing that, in the context of the 
duty of loyalty, typically justifies enhanced judicial scrutiny. 
Our discussion then considers whether these limitations on 
shareholder litigation are appropriate. We consider the concern of 
lawyer-driven litigation that animates calls for litigation reform and 
debate whether shareholder litigation on these topics presents the 
risk of abusive litigation. We also consider the viability of gover­
nance alternatives. While executive compensation has been the 
target of considerable experimentation in regulatory reform, 
corporate philanthropy has received comparably little attention. 
Yet, the materials demonstrate that both topics present consistent 
examples of management excesses that corporate law appears 
unable to remedy. Indeed, these topics demonstrate the failure of 
corporate law to address essential problems stemming from the 
separation of ownership and control. 
We conclude by considering reform efforts that run counter to the 
current popular wisdom. Should the procedural or substantive rules 
governing shareholder litigation be modified to provide more 
meaningful review, either in general or in particular subject areas? 
Students have at their disposal an illustration of this approach in 
the one area in which Delaware courts have applied a more rigorous 
standard of review: management's use of anti-takeover defenses. 121 
1 2 1  See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del . 1 9 85) (adopting 
intermediate standard of scrutiny for management's use of anti-takeover defenses to resist 
hostile tender offer); Ronald Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware's Intermediate Standard 
for Defensive Tactics: Is There Substance to Proportionality Review?, 44 Bus. LAW. 247, 248 
( 1989) (describing Unocal test). 
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Chuck Yablon has made a similar proposal with respect to 
compensation decisions and suggested that courts use a proportion­
ality test to evaluate executive compensation rather than a deferen­
tial waste or business judgment standard. 122 Under Yablon's test, 
courts would ask whether executive compensation is reasonable in 
light of the expected benefits to the corporation. 123 Yablon argues 
that a proportionality test would be workable and, if limited to an 
area like executive compensation, would not present significant 
risks of litigation abuse. 124 Using the tools provided by our analysis 
of shareholder litigation, students can analyze this claim and 
discuss the workability of Yablon's proposal. 
Finally, students can consider the potential deterrent effect of 
this regulatory change on corporate behavior. Too frequently our 
teaching emphasizes the lawyer's role in litigation, yet the business 
lawyer commonly acts as an adviser when the client seeks to 
minimize the risk of litigation. In these cases, legal rules serve as 
the backdrop for corporate transactional decisionmaking. Yablon 
claims that the potential for greater judicial involvement would 
deter management overreaching by invigorating board deliberations 
over compensation decisions. 125 He offers an example of how his 
proposal might affect the dialogue between a CEO and his 
counsel. 126 It can be particularly useful for students to play the role 
of corporate counsel and consider the way legal standards can affect 
their advice to a corporate board or their ability to deal with a 
recalcitrant CEO. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In teaching students about the role of shareholder litigation, I 
hope to leave them with a richer appreciation for the nuances in the 
currently ongoing debates about litigation reform. I want my 
students to understand the concerns about litigation abuse as well 
;zz Charles M. Yablon, Overcompensating: The Corporate Lawyer and Executive Pay, 92 
COLUM. L. REV. 1 867,  1 897-98 ( 1992) (book review). 
123 I d. at 1897.  
12� Id. at 1 90 1 .  
125 Id. at 1 897-98. 
126 ld. 
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as the economic structure of shareholder litigation that creates the 
potential for this abuse. At the same time, I do not want students 
to fall prey to the Nirvana fallacy. The role of shareholder litigation 
must be understood within the context of corporate law's effort to 
address the agency costs associated with the separation of owner­
ship and control. Limitations on the effectiveness of governance 
mechanisms have the potential to sacrifice management account­
ability. Accordingly, reform efforts must consider the availability of 
alternative methods of controlling management self-dealing. By 
seeking to cultivate a thoughtful approach to the role of litigation in 
corporate governance, I try to keep my students questioning the 
purposes served by the legal rules they study. 
